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Donald Eugene "Don" Nicoll was born in Boston, Massachusetts, on August 4, 1927, and grew 
up in the West Roxbury section of the city.  He is the son of George and Mary Nicoll. He 
attended Robert Gould Shaw Junior High School and Boston English High School and graduated 
from Colby College in Waterville, Maine in 1949, majoring in History with a minor in 
Government.  Don met his future wife, Hilda Farnum, also a Colby student, when they worked in 
the resort town of Ocean Park, Maine, in the summer of 1944.  Nicoll began his graduate work at 
Pennsylvania State College in 1949, where he received a teaching fellowship in the Department 
of History. His graduate studies  concentrated on American history, specifically the period from 
the Revolutionary War to the Civil War .. His M.A. (1952) thesis was on the Alien and Sedition 
Acts. 
 
Starting in 1951, Nicoll and his family settled in Buckfield, Maine where he picked apples and 
taught part time at Stephen's High School, located in Rumford. Nicoll began working as an 
announcer for WLAM radio in Lewiston, Maine. He became a reporter and then news editor for 
WLAM and WLAM-TV. In June 1954, Nicoll left WLAM to become Executive Secretary of the 
Democratic State Committee at the request of Frank M. Coffin, who has just become chairman. 
Mr. Coffin was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from Maine's Second Congressional 
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District in 1956 and Nicoll went to Washington, DC, as his administrative assistant, continuing 
in that post until December 1960, the end of Congressman Coffin's second term. Mr. Coffin ran 
for governor in 1960 and was defeated. After the election Senator Edmund S. Muskie asked 
Nicoll to join his staff as legislative assistant and news secretary. Nicoll served in that position 
until 1962, when he became administrative assistant. He continued in that post until 1971, when 
he became personal advisor to Senator Muskie. He left the senate office in mid-1972. 
 
From 1972 until his retirement in 2005 Nicoll worked as a program and policy planner, first as a 
consultant (1972-73), then as chairman and chief executive officer of the New England Land 
Grant Universities Joint Operations Committee (1973-1975), then as coordinator of planning and 
vice president for planning and public affairs for the Maine Medical Center (1975-1986), then as 
a consultant (1986-2005). His clients were primarily in the non-profit sector and included, 
universities, libraries, education associations, health care organizations and social service 
agencies. He also worked as a volunteer, heading a variety of public policy projects, including 
the Maine Task Force on Government Reorganization, the Maine State Compensation 
Commission, the Maine (Mental Health) Systems Assessment Commission, the Maine 
Consortium for Health Professions Education, the Southern Maine Community Television 
Consortium, the Maine Special Commission on Government Reorganization (co-chair), the 
Board of Visitors of the University of Southern Maine's Edmund S. Muskie School of Public 
Service, the Maine-Aomori Sister-State Advisory Council and the Governor's Allagash 
Wilderness Waterway Working Group. 
 




Scope and Content Note 
 
Interview includes discussions of: how Demonstration Cities became Model Cities; staff and 
issues of the Government Operations Committee; Senator Muskie and staff relations; factors 
contributing to the failure of the sugar beet venture in Maine; conversion of closed air force 
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Andrea L'Hommedieu:   This is an interview with Donald E. Nicoll on June 29th, the year 
2004, at the Muskie Archives at Bates College, and this is Andrea L'Hommedieu.  And Don, 
we're going to continue our discussions today.  I think first of all you wanted to follow up on an 
anecdote you were telling about Model Cities and how it changed its name from Demonstration 
Cities. 
 
Don Nicoll:   Well, the original proposal for the legislation labeled it Demonstration Cities, and 
the reason was that the administration wanted to have demonstration projects with a new 
approach to dealing with the areas of the city that had suffered from decay, what in the old days 
had been targeted for urban renewal.  And the concern that had developed revolved around 
massive clearance of areas of the cities and rebuilding, and, in the worst cases, such 
developments as the very large high rise public housing replacing what had been manageable 
neighborhoods, and restorable neighborhoods. 
 
Just as a side recollection, when I was growing up in Boston I attended the English High School, 
which at the time was located in the old South End.  The school building had been built around 
the time of the Civil War and was still there.  It was an area of considerable decay and it was 
targeted later in the 1950s and into the early '60s for urban renewal.  When one looks back at the 
areas in the South End and the adjacent areas, you see in old maps and photographs a series of 
small parks with brick housing surrounding it, and then neighborhood shopping areas on the 
streets.  And with the movement of the population, that is the upwardly mobile population, out 
into the suburban areas, those areas decayed and lower and lower income people moved in and 
the housing deteriorated under absentee landlords.  But instead of restoring those, under Ed 
Logue, L-O-G-U-E, who was the big example of an urban renewal person, there was total 
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clearance in that area and old buildings were torn down.  The historic areas were lost and many 
of the very attractive features of community living in an urban setting were lost.  Well, the 
administration wanted to move away from this, led by people like Bob Wood, Robert C. Wood 
who was the Undersecretary of Housing and Urban Development at the time.  And so they 
proposed a program that would have as I recall fifty model cities, or as they called them 
demonstration projects in the cities. 
 
By the time the legislation came forward in the House and the Senate, there was considerable 
agitation and demonstrating on the war in Vietnam and on the subject of Civil Rights, and we 
were having incidents in a number of cities, riots in fact after '64-'65, in that period and on into 
the, after Model Cities was passed.  But Demonstration Cities became a red flag, if you will, for 
conservatives in the Congress and outside the Congress.  And one of the things that we proposed 
in negotiations with the Johnson administration for rewriting the legislation to make it more 
palatable to the middle-of-the-road people and some of the conservatives in the Congress, was to 
change the name from Demonstration Cities to Model Cities.  And we were told, in no uncertain 
terms by Joe Califano as I remember, that Demonstration Cities was the name, that was what the 
President wanted and it would stay.  And so it did through passage of the legislation.  Not 
through passage of the legislation; I believe that the, I have to go back and look this up, but I 
think in the final stages somehow the name got switched.  We didn't switch it, but somebody else 
did.  And finally it became Model Cities, in spite of the President. 
 
AL:    And was Model Cities the name that you had suggested to them to change it to? 
 
DN:   Yes.  Model was fine, model did not conjure up the images of violent demonstrations.  But 
Johnson for some reason held on to that as long as he could, but then embraced the new name 
after it was enacted and praised by people. 
 
AL:    Let's move now to the IGR Subcommittee, or the Intergovernmental Relations 
Subcommittee and the work that was going on there. 
 
DN:    The Intergovernmental Relations [Sub]Committee was an outgrowth of work that had 
been going on, starting in the Eisenhower administration on the subject of federal-state relations. 
 And as a matter of fact, Senator Muskie's predecessor, Senator Payne, had done some work in 
that arena because he was, he too was a former governor.  And there was a lot of interest, and 
some concern, over how the federal government and the states should divide up responsibilities 
and how the federal government should support the states and local governments in managing 
some problems that were common to the states.  Didn't necessarily fit into the Interstate 
Commerce clause of the Constitution, but they were common enough problems that there was a 
national interest and federal action. 
  
The, there was an advisory commission on intergovernmental relations formed; Senator Muskie 
served on that.  And in the Senate, a Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations was created 
in the then Government Operations Committee, and Senator Muskie became chairman of that.  
And that committee had its own staff, and he was able to hire individuals who were directly 
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responsible to him.  The three staff directors, well there were at least four, in order: first was 
David Bruce Walker, who had been a professor of government at Bowdoin College and later was 
on the faculty, I believe may today, 2004, be an emeritus member of the faculty at Wesleyan 
University.  And he was followed by Edwin Webber, W-E-B-B-E-R, known as ‘Ike”, who was 
from Maine and was a political scientist as well.  And Ike was succeeded by Charles Smith, who 
had been I believe in the Department of Housing and Urban Development and a long time civil 
servant.  No, I've reversed that.  Charlie was there, and then Ike Webber, and then Ike was 
succeeded by Alvin From, F-R-O-M, who was the last of the directors of that subcommittee 
under Senator Muskie. 
 
And that committee dealt primarily with the questions of revenue sharing, management of 
federal mandates, a lot of it was study work rather than legislative work, but there was some 
legislation for modifying the relationship between the state and federal government.  And 
ultimately, the Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee became a very important sort of 
laboratory for studying new approaches to such matters as the federal budget.  And the federal 
budget legislation originated there, and some of the staff from the subcommittee and from the 
Muskie office went to the Budget Committee after it was formed, but most of that took place 
after I had left the staff. 
 
We were faced in the '60s, starting back when John Donovan was administrative assistant from 
'59 until '62, early '62, with trying to manage the legislative work for a senator from a relatively 
small state with a relatively small staff, and keep on top of the issues that were important to him 
on behalf of his constituency, and also his responsibilities as member of three significant 
committees, even though they weren't his first choice, and all of the other legislation that was 
coming through the Congress at the time.  This was the period when we were not only dealing 
with budgets, appropriations, matters of trade policy, agriculture policy, urban development and 
housing, education aid, etcetera, but civil rights and Medicare, and a host of very demanding 
legislation. 
 
Early on we, I guess I was the one who did this primarily, but in 1962 when I became the 
administrative assistant, I started dividing up the responsibility for legislative, staff legislative 
oversight.  And we linked the oversight for legislative work to staff work on cases, so that the 
staff members who were responsible, for example, for service connected cases were also 
responsible for defense legislation.  And those who worked on agricultural issues were 
responsible for agricultural legislation.  And the committee staff work, where we had staff 
members on the major committees, reported in effect, to different members of the staff. 
 
And in that period from 1962 until roughly 1969, I took responsibility for the environmental 
work, particularly starting in '63 when the subcommittee was created, for the banking and 
currency work connected with housing and urban development, and for the intergovernmental 
relations and government operations work, and other members of the staff took responsibility for 
other areas. 
 
For example, when George Mitchell was executive assistant, because of his background as an 
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anti-trust lawyer working on banking cases, he took on all of the banking and currency work 
dealing with banking legislation and monetary legislation.  He also took on the work of the area 
redevelopment administration, and the federal investment in economic development, and a 
couple of other areas.  And he generally supervised those areas dealing with agriculture and with 
the Defense Department, etcetera.  So there was a close link in the way we managed the 
constituent relationships and constituent service and the flow of ideas and the responses to 
legislation on certain specific issues. 
 
The, as one will see if you listen to the interview that I have with Leon Billings, who became the 
staff director for the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, Senator Muskie wanted to deal 
with as few people as possible and he expected me in particular to protect his time, and not have 
him inundated with staff people coming in.  And that caused real problems, particularly for 
Leon, at the beginning of his work as the head of the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution.  
And there's a little, fascinating little bit of by play there that emerged fully only long after we 
had both worked for Senator Muskie, on the relationship between the subcommittee staff and the 
Senator, and the staff, notably the AA, and the perspective from the subcommittee staff and the 
perspective from the senator's personal staff, and how Leon's perspective changed as he worked 
with the Senator after I had moved off, first into the vice presidential and then the presidential 
campaign, and then left the staff, and ultimately when he became the administrative assistant.  
And that's worth looking at, both in terms of the staff relationships and the working 
relationships, and Senator Muskie and how he preferred to function. 
 
But through that period I think one cannot understand a lot of the work that Senator Muskie did 
and the way legislation evolved, without taking a close look at the way the staff functioned and 
who was responsible.  And anyone who looks at the Muskie Archives and the original papers 
needs to look carefully at marginal notations on memoranda and documents to see who was 
signing off on the legislation, who was making notes for Senator Muskie on legislation, and what 
the flow of requests to staff and the flow of information from staff was.  Because they played, the 
staff members played a very important role in informing him and in carrying out his wishes with, 
both with committees and on the legislation, and in relationship to people back in the state. 
 
Another issue of relationships, of course, is the relationship between the Senator and the Johnson 
administration, with the president personally and with the Johnson administration, and the 
relationship between the Muskie office and the executive branch during this period. 
 
I think we've talked before about Senator Muskie and his arrival in the Senate and his clashes 
with Lyndon Johnson.  By the early to mid 1960s, he had become a very important member of 
the Senate in key areas of interest to the Johnson administration as well as to the country: the 
environment, public works developments, the intergovernmental relations.  As the number of 
federal programs expanded under the Great Society, those relationships with the states, how the 
money was to flow, who was to control the money as it flowed into the states, and how much 
control the federal government would have under those mandates, all of those issues were being 
addressed by the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, and, of course, through the 




We were deeply involved in the work of the Senate and the concerns of the administration with 
urban blight, and the clashes that grew out of the Civil Rights movement and the results of, long 
term results, of slavery and discrimination and racial bias.  And increasingly during this period, 
we were working with members of the administration in different departments and playing a 
significant role in many cases in shaping not only legislation after it arrived in the Senate, but 
also before the administration submitted proposals to the Senate.  And those relationships need 
to be examined in some detail. 
 
The juggling also involved trade offs in terms of Maine interests.  I think I have mentioned 
before, the fact that one of the prices the Johnson administration paid for Senator Muskie's 
management, and successful management, of the Model Cities legislation was the addition of 
Portland to the list of cities that would be eligible for Model Cities grants, and Lewiston 
ultimately, the expansion of that program.  And that was a direct result of the Senator's concerns 
with what was happening in Maine and how Maine and Maine communities would benefit from 
federal programs.  And we spent considerable amount of time on shepherding the Portland 
proposal, and later the Lewiston proposal, through the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development for the grant monies that made possible the Portland Model Cities program.  
Which, I might add is, from my point of view, one of the most significant federal investments 
that's been made in Maine in a long time, if one looks at the consequences of that investment and 
the people who were influenced by the Portland Model Cities program. 
 
The other areas where we played a significant role were, one, the application of the Area 
Redevelopment Act and related legislation, plus the Defense Department legislation affecting the 
closing of bases, what we were able to do with both the closing of the air base at Presque Isle 
and the Dow Air Force Base in Bangor.  And the key people in that work included Ross Davis, 
who had been with the Small Business Administration and then with the, was in the Department 
of Commerce as an assistant secretary, Department of Commerce. 
 
And Ross was a long time friend of Elizabeth Donahue, who had been an assistant to 
Congressman Frank Coffin.  Libby, as she was known, was from Portland.  Her mother was the 
first woman postmistress in Portland [Maine], the city of Portland post office.  And the Lafayette 
Hotel, now the Lafayette House, was built by her father, who was a big builder.  And Helen 
Donahue, Mrs. Donahue, was a power in the Democratic party in the 1930s, and then was named 
postmistress.  So Libby went to Washington, was active in Americans for Democratic Action, 
got involved in the Frank Coffin campaigns and worked for Frank as a legislative assistant.  And 
among her friends was Ross Davis, whom we got to know, and Ross was extremely helpful in 
terms of matters involving small business legislation and the Department of Commerce, and 
ultimately the conversion of Dow Air Force Base into Bangor International Airport and the 
whole series of community uses of the property that had been part of the air base.  The 
University of Maine System offices, now located in what had been military housing on the base, 
the Maine Public Broadcasting's original state university broadcasting system on that property, 
the Bangor Community College, the city's nursing home and other institutions, and now 




And Senator Muskie took the position on base closings that if a base was no longer needed for 
military purposes exclusively, then it ought to be closed, but the federal government had a 
responsibility to assist in the conversion so that the community was either benefitted by the 
closing or suffered the least harm possible.  And his, his success in supporting the administration 
and in providing leadership, legislative leadership, for the administration in areas like the 
environment, Model Cities, etcetera, made it possible to be very effective in working with 
different departments in the administration.  And the tie-in between legislative work and case 
work made it possible for the staff, a small staff, to work very effectively, I think, with the 
administration. 
 
Our other focuses in Maine on top of the routine matters, if you will, of agriculture, the Farmers 
Home Administration, etc., were on the upper St. John and Passamaquoddy projects that led 
ultimately to the proposals for the Dickey-Lincoln School Dam and combined with a 
Passamaquoddy proposal.  And that, although the power projects never went through, one of the 
side effects of that effort was the creation of the Allagash Wilderness Waterway which we 
protected in two ways.  One was to advance the Dickey-Lincoln School project which had 
minimal flooding in the Allagash River to a point below Twin Brook Rapids, and the agreement 
with the federal government to create a state owned and protected wilderness waterway.  And 
that, too, was a consequence of the close working relationship between Senator Muskie and the 
Johnson administration.  We were able to convince the Department of the Interior to bend its 
rather rigid rules on how control would be exerted, and to provide fifty percent of the cost of 
acquisition and initial stabilization of the wilderness waterway. 
 
The other less successful effort that I remember from this period was the sugar beet factory.  And 
that represented a very strong effort to benefit the farmers in Aroostook County by getting 
diversification of the crop and to take advantage of federal laws providing subsidies for sugar 
beet production.  It came a cropper in the end for a couple of reasons: one, I believe, was that the 
agricultural research specialists in the University of Maine and at the agriculture research station 
in Aroostook county were very enthusiastic about the prospects of a new crop, and they allowed 
their enthusiasm and their interest to divert them from exercising really strong scientific 
discipline in interpreting the results of their growth trials. 
 
And as a consequence, we did not know as much as we should have known about the difficulties 
of growing sugar beets, not only in the Maine climate but in the Maine soil.  The number of 
rocks in the soil in Aroostook County meant that you could not have the deep roots and 
untangled roots that were possible in the more sandy soil of the west, in the irrigated areas.  And 
the lack of certain water supply, because we don't use irrigation in Maine as much, meant that 
you couldn't have as consistent a crop.  So we had results known as sprangled roots, that's s-p-r-
a-n-g-l-e-d roots that were caused by the rocks that got in the way of the roots as they grew, and 
that was not as apparent early on as it should have been before the major investments were made 
in the sugar beet plant. 
 
And the other problem was that Freddy Vahlsing, V-A-H-L-S-I-N-G, the entrepreneur who was 
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central to the project, was in many ways a wonderful person.  But he was also determined to do 
things his way and cut corners and alienated the farmers by his handling of their bills, etcetera, 
and alienated the bureaucrats he had to deal with, including those in the environmental 
protection agencies as well as the agriculture department folks.  And as a result, the project came 
crashing down ultimately, sadly, and it meant that Aroostook did not get the kind of diversity 
that it was looking for at the time. 
  
But it involved major investment of Senator Muskie's time early on.  I remember he and I went 
to Colorado for a pollution control hearing and while there met the head of the Great Western 
sugar beet company and some of his people, and went to look at one of their sugar beet refineries 
and some of their growing areas, and talked to them about the possibility of coming into Maine 
and being a major player there.  And those kinds of negotiations were part of our effort to 
promote it. Ultimately George Mitchell played a substantial role working with Freddy Vahlsing 
and actually became his lawyer.  But all of those efforts came to naught because the 
fundamentals weren't there. 
 
And we were struggling during that period because there were growing demands on Senator 
Muskie on the national level, a couple of kinds of demands.  Well, three kinds of demands.  One 
was the demand for leadership in the significant areas of housing and urban development, 
environmental protection, and the intergovernmental relations work.  The second demand was 
for leadership and response on the Vietnam War, which was an increasing thorn in everyone's 
side.  And finally, the interest in him as a potential presidential candidate. 
 
Now, one of the items I had not talked about is a Government Operations Committee.  I was 
going to say project, it was not really a project, it was a drawn out incident involving an 
investigation by the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee of the Government Operations 
Committee of what was known as TFX.  This was a dispute stemming from the proposal to 
develop aircraft, both fighters and bombers, that could take off slowly, could fly at supersonic 
speeds, and could also cruise at subsonic speeds easily.  And to deal with the technical demands 
of those kinds of performance, they devised swing wings, that is wings that mechanically swung 
in close to the fuselage and had very little area for use at supersonic speeds, and swung out to 
present very large wing areas for subsonic flight and, take off, landing and subsonic flight.  The 
Defense Department had put these out for competitive proposals and the two leading candidates 
were General Dynamics and Boeing, and General Dynamics and its allies were based in St. 
Louis and Boeing, of course, in Seattle. 
The chairman of the Government Operations Committee and chairman of the subcommittee on 
investigations was John McClellan of Arkansas who was no friend of Lyndon Johnson or the, 
Robert McNamara of the Defense Department.  He was a very ultra conservative southerner, and 
anti-civil rights.  And the other person who was key in this, on the Government Operations 
Committee, was Senator Henry AScoop@ Jackson of Washington, sometimes referred to as the 
senator from Boeing.  And Boeing lost in the contest, and the Defense Department announced 
that it would go with General Dynamics.  And the designation of the plane was TFX; ultimately 
it was the F111.  And the Defense Department was faced with an investigation, because of 
accusations that there was all sorts of hanky panky going on in awarding the contract and not 
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giving it to Boeing.  The Defense Department and the Johnson administration had no one on the 
committee to act for them and to see that they got a fair hearing, and so they came to Senator 
Muskie and asked him if he would become, in effect, their defense counsel on the committee. 
 
And that drew his administrative assistant into the picture, and I became, because if he agreed to 
do it he would have to do it himself and his own staff would have to staff the work, because they 
couldn't trust anybody on the subcommittee.  So I ended up being the research analyst, if you 
will, on TFX.  David McGiffert was counsel to Robert McNamara.  David had and has a home 
on Mt. Desert Island and had close ties to Maine, so he and I and a few others worked together.  
And I learned more about the TFX than I ever wanted to know about any airplane, and we spent 
months dealing with top secret military information working on that investigation.  Ultimately 
the administration got what amounted to a clean bill of health, and although the plane wasn't a 
hundred percent successful I guess it provided a transition to the next generation of planes, and 
we gained a lot in terms of credibility within the Johnson administration, which was useful. 
 
AL:    So successful in - 
 
DN:    Successful in that respect.  Part of my history as being a defense analyst - ha-ha. 
 
AL:    Well, great, Don.  I think we should probably stop here for today, then we'll pick up again 
soon. 
 
End of Interview 
